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ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on challenges to improving the realism of socially intelligent agents 
and attempts to reflect the state of the art in human behavior modeling with particular 
attention to the impact of personality/cultural values and affect as well as biology/stress 
upon individual coping and group decision-making.  The first section offers an 
assessment of the state of the practice and of the need to integrate valid human 
performance moderator functions (PMFs) from traditionally separated sub-fields of the 
behavioral literature.  The second section pursues this goal by postulating a unifying 
architecture and principles for integrating existing PMF theories and models. It also 
illustrates a PMF testbed called PMFserv created for implementating and studying how 
PMFs may contribute to such an architecture. To date it interconnects versions of PMFs 
on physiology and stress (Janis-Mann, Gillis-Hursh, others); personality, cultural and 
emotive processes (Damasio, Cognitive Appraisal-OCC, value systems); perception 
(Gibsonian affordance); social processes (relations, identity, trust, nested intentionality); 
and cognition (affect- and stress-augmented decision theory, bounded rationality). The 
third section summarizes several usage case studies (asymmetric warfare, civil unrest, 
and political leaders) and concludes with lessons learned. Implementing and inter-
operating this broad collection of PMFs helps to open the agenda for research on 
syntheses that can help the field reach a greater level of maturity. Part II presents a case 
study in using PMFserv for rapid scenario composability and realistic agent behavior. 
 
Keywords:  personality and emotion; social and cultural factors; physiology and stress; 
agent cognition; unified architecture 
 
1.  Introduction 
The fields of virtual reality and microworld simulation have advanced significantly in the 
past decade.  Today, computer generated personas or agents that populate these worlds 
and interact with human users are now deployed in many endeavors and avenues of 
investigation.  A few of many example application areas are Hollywood animations for 
movies, cartoons, and advertising; immersive industrial and safety training simulations; 
distributed, interactive military war games and mission rehearsals; and personal assistant 
agents to reduce technologic complexity for the general public, among others. 
 
A common challenge running throughout these applications is to increase the realism of 
the synthetic agents’ behavior and coping abilities.  This is not an idle fancy, but a serious 
 
objective that directly affects the bottom line of commercial concerns, mission 
achievement in non-commercial organizations, and the safety and health of individuals  
who need to transfer skill sets from virtual to real worlds.  Agent-oriented products that 
are more affective and offer a better cognitive fit tend to sell better, such as the successful 
games Tamagotchi or Catz and Dogz. This lesson applies to embedded agents as well as 
stand-alone products. People are known to anthropomorphize technologic items such as 
cars, slot machines, computers, ATM machines, etc.  A strategy of beating the 
competition is beginning to emerge by including greater degrees of personality, human 
modes of interactivity (e.g., voice synthesis for car navigation systems), and emotive 
features in personas embedded ubiquitously (e.g., lip-synched and facially-accurate 
expressions) (e.g., see Reeves & Nass, 1996; Hayes-Roth, 1998).  Similarly, in training, 
analytical, and education systems with military applications there is a growing realization 
that greater social subtlety and behavioral sensitivity in synthetic agents provides human 
trainees with both (1) more and better opportunities to explore alternative strategies and 
tactics, and (2) higher levels of skill attainment (e.g., see Sloman & Logan, 1999).  These 
benefits are possible if the tactics, performance, and behavior of synthetic agents change 
in response to alterations in an array of behavioral variables.  As a few examples, one 
would like agent behavior to realistically change as a function of their assigned native 
culture (vital for executing missions against forces from different countries), their level of 
fatigue and stress over time and in different situations, and/or their effectiveness 
following the loss of an opposing force’s leader. 
 
1.1  Challenges for Increasing the Realism of Human Behavior Models 
There has been significant progress toward the development of improved human-like 
performance of synthetic agents.  However, several serious problems continue to 
challenge researchers and developers. 
 
Developers have insufficient behavioral knowledge.  To date, models of culture, 
personality, affect and behavior that have been commercialized still tend to be shallow 
and unsatisfying.  There is no deep model of human-agent interactivity.  Synthetic agent 
forces are naïve and unable to act with the credibility or behavioral variety seen in human 
operators. Changing this is on the cutting edge of current research: e.g., Silverman et al. 
(2001, 2002a&b), Laird and vanLent (2001), among others. 
 
Artificial life has focused on low level functionality.  Character animators have created 
virtual life forms (e.g., fish, plants, talking heads, full body characters, and groups) that 
are physically realistic, geometrically accurate, and kinesthetically natural when moving 
about within their virtual settings (e.g., see Badler, Allbeck, Zhao, Bunn, 2002).  There 
has even been significant development of architectures to produce animated characters 
that react appropriately to a small range of emotive and environmental stimuli such as 
fright and flight, flocking, and lip- and facial-movement-synching to utterances or 
stimuli: (e.g., Terzopoulos, 1999).  However, these tend to be reactive systems that 
perform no deliberative or high-level decision making or cognitive processing such as has 
been conceived by the artificial intelligence community. 
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Artificial intelligence (AI) focuses on high level cognitive functionality.  Researchers 
in the “rational agent” community have created a wide array of methods, often formal 
and grounded logics, to support agent reasoning (Bradshaw et al., 1999), inter-agent 
communications (Labrou, Finin, & Peng, 1999), and autonomous planning and learning 
(Tambe et al., 1995).  These methods make it possible for unembodied agents to sense 
and respond to their virtual environments.  However, extensive computing resources are 
necessary to support such abilities.  It remains to be seen whether the necessary 
computing cycles can also be designed to support similar realistic abilities in relatively 
more resource-intensive embodied life characters.  In addition, care must be taken when 
applying artificial intelligence to enhance the behavioral and coping fidelity of synthetic 
characters.  It is easy to use these techniques to create capabilities that no real human 
being would possess.  For example, a rational agent can perform its tasks without 
suffering the effects of fatigue, stress, heat, illness, bio/chemical exposure, or other 
factors that would likely affect the performance of a real human operator.  Surprisingly, 
until quite recently this also was true of widely respected ‘cognitive models’ (e.g., 
SOAR; ACT-R, Anderson, 1990) whose AI-based designs tend to ignore much that is 
known about how cognition varies as a function of individual differences, situational 
change, and task attributes. Since the late 1990s, the lead author has been researching 
how PMF approaches can turn this tide. Recent evidence indicates the tide is turning and 
some researchers on frameworks such as SOAR and ACT-R, among others, are now 
seeking to add such phenomena a posteriori (Belavkin, 2001, Ritter, 2002, Chong, 2004).  
 
Behavioral researchers tend to ignore integration and implementation. Worse are 
the "silos."  There are well over one million pages of peer-reviewed, published studies 
on human behavior and performance as a function of demographics, personality 
differences, cognitive style, situational and emotive variables, task elements, group and 
organizational dynamics, and culture.  This is a potentially rich resource for agent 
developers.  Unfortunately, almost none of the existing literature addresses how to 
interpret and translate reported findings as principles and methods suitable for 
implementation or synthetic agent development (Silverman, 1991).  Too often, factors 
described in the human performance literature are only roughly quantified.  Informed 
judgment and/or additional testing is required to parameterize factors as dose-response 
curves or performance moderator functions (PMFs).  It is time consuming and often 
beyond the abilities of non-psychologist agent builders to determine the validity and 
generalizability of findings reported in behavioral scientific studies. Worse still, these 
literatures are highly specialized with deep "silos" separating the many topics one needs 
to synthesize for agent behavior. Any progress on such a synthesis is hampered by lack of 
first principles from the literature, and any incentive for behavioral researchers to benefit 
from computational integrations. Only small pockets of behavioral researchers currently 
straddle these concerns (e.g., Ness et al. 2005, Payr & Trappl, 2004). PMFserv is meant 
to help its users eliminate such barriers and to open possibilities for syntheses. 
 
There is a dearth of interchange standards.  There are few interchange standards in the 
AI and game-maker communities.  One cannot readily substitute characters or agents 
from one simulation or game to run in the world of another: e.g., see Bjorkman, Barry, & 
Tyler (2001).  Existing systems cannot easily be modified or extended to incorporate 
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interesting new factors, findings, or code. Interchange standards are needed to exploit the 
rich diversity of achievements from various related fields of development.  At a basic 
level, such standards would cover API specifications for plug and play modules.  Far 
more complex standards could be developed to support the exchange of agent knowledge 
and ontologies, behavior models, and the means to apply them within a diverse variety of 
systems. 
 
There is a need to validate “useful” models of human behavior.  According to 
folkism, “all models are broken, some are useful.”  No model will ever capture all the 
nuances of human emotion, the full range of stress effects, or how these factors affect 
judgment and decision making.  However, to the extent that a model provides a valid 
representation of human behavior, it will likely be useful to those who wish to simulate 
that behavior.  Unfortunately, the problem of model validity has no simple solution.  It is 
difficult to run existing simulations against real past events.  Many first principle models 
from the behavioral science literature have been derived within a particular setting, 
whereas simulation developers may wish to deploy those models in different contexts.  
Likewise, there are validity issues raised by AI models of agent reasoning that are able to 
simulate human task performance in the absence of human-like reasoning.  Is it even 
possible to validate the integration of multiple factors (e.g., stress and fatigue) when the 
research literature is largely limited to the study of independent rather than interactive 
effects of these factors?  What methods of validation should be used, and for what 
purposes are models to be considered trustworthy?  These are just a few of the many 
issues and questions that must be resolved in order to identify whether and how an agent-
based model of human behavior should be implemented. 
 
1.2  Human Behavior Modeling for Virtual Agents 
To overcome the obstacles identified above, it would be useful to remove cross-
community barriers and create a set of sharable resources for the modeling and 
simulation community.  This goal is considered here, beginning with a discussion in this 
section of what can be learned from the behavioral science literature and then moving on 
in Section 2 to the question of how those assets can be integrated with existing, ‘reusable’ 
models of human performance and cognition. Part II of this paper further explores the 
reuse question looking into how to add such models to legacy software and simulators. 
 
In terms of what can be learned, there is a voluminous literature, easily numbering in the 
10,000s of studies, on the subject of human performance under stress – or “performance 
moderator functions” (PMFs).  The author has abstracted about 500 PMFs from this 
literature and has begun to explore a common mathematical framework for representing 
them and how to use them in agent behavior simulations (Silverman, 1999; Silverman, 
Johns, Shin, & Weaver, 2002; Bharathy, Chung, Silverman, & Cornwell, 2002). One of 
the earliest studies in this field generated the now classic Yerkes-Dodson “inverted u” 
curve, which illustrates that as a stimulus or moderator is increased, performance is 
initially poor, then improves, and then falls off again after passing a threshold (Yerkes-
Dodson, 1908).  Thus, performance can be better in slightly chaotic, moderately time-
pressured settings than in settings absent of stress, though this varies with individual 
differences and may not apply to all moderators. 
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In particular, we are interested in emergent macro-behavior due to micro-decisions of 
bounded-rational agents and with developing a framework that permits one to examine 
the impacts of biology, stress, personality, culture, emotion, social relations, and 
decisionmaking upon human coping behavior. With such a framework, one should, as an 
example, be able to readily model and visually render what makes one protesting crowd 
throw stones while another peacefully demonstrates. Or to study why one leader attracts 
followers and another is shunned. 
 
2.  Integrating the Many PMFs into a Unified Behavior Architecture 
The PMF findings discussed above suggest that there is a large, often untapped resource 
to assist those who create human performance simulations.  Much can be gained the more 
that simulation developers work to embrace such collections and to implement and test 
their results.  This, in turn, should and could create a forcing function back upon 
behavioral scientists.  Behavioral science has produced some compelling models and 
PMFs of individual factors, but they still need to do a better job of studying and 
evaluating integrative frameworks.   
 
This broad study of so many PMFs lead the lead author of this paper in 1999 to postulate 
a systems sythesis in the form of a set of principles and a unifying architecture for agent 
coping behavior that have guided the evolution of this research and that are now repeated 
here: 
 (1) Inter-relations Between the Parts -- In the system literature by definition, a 
synthesis must focus on the inter-relations between the parts so as to foster understanding 
the purposeful behavior of the whole. In this case, the "parts" that need to be synthesized 
should be codifiable from the major branches of the literature such as shown by the large 
blocks of Figure 1 (we postpone discussion of many of Figure 1's details). It is widely 
accepted today that coping behavior (the synthesis we are interested in) is somehow 
influenced by biology/stress; personality and cultural values and emotion; social 
relations; and rational cognition; as well as perceptual and memory functions. Yet it is 
difficult to locate sources that address such a wholism and how these big parts play 
together.  
 (2)  Subsystems are Systems as Well -- Here again, one is interested in the 
relationships between the parts. PMFs from diverse sources should be implemented and 
inter-operated to study modular sub-systems. Thus, the major boxes of Figure 1 
themselves should synthesize diverse PMFs. Indeed, Figure 2 shows a number of lower-
level PMFs that have been linked together in our architecture and the linkages between 
them – again we discuss the details in the next section. What is worth noting here is that 
many of the PMFs from the literature do provide useful pieces of the puzzle, but in order 
to connect them we had to add new PMFs (rounded edge boxes of Figure 2). In other 
cases we could only implement loose interpretations (quadrilaterals of Figure 2). In both 
Principle 1 and 2, the systems researcher is interested in accuracy, not precision since 
precision is a distraction from better understanding relationships between parts. This 
means the diverse PMFs of Figure 2 often are implemented as first order approximations 
(e.g., linear systems), and future implementations might improve on that. 
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(3) Study Best of Breed PMFs -- The unifying architecture in Figure 1 may seem 
high level; however, that is necessitated by the state-of-the-art today. The goal is to study 
best of breed PMFs even if they only implement portions of subsystems (sub-modules). 
The idea is to study how to get them to inter-operate so that modules and larger wholisms 
may be assembled, studied, and validated or invalidated. As soon as one opens the door 
to modeling the impact of stress, culture, and emotion on rationality, one must be 
amenable to the idea that competing views, results, models, and approaches have to be 
examined and potentially integrated. The point of such a research program should not be 
to argue for one approach or theory over another, but to provide ways to readily study 
alternative models of whatever contributes to the phenomena of interest. This means that 
any computer implementation must support plugin/plugout/override capabilities, and that 
specific PMFs as illustrated in Figure 2 (octagonal shapes) should be testable and 
validatable against field data such as what they were originally derived from. Our 
research goal is to avoid locking in on PMFs and, in so doing, thereby creating a 
monolith. Instead, every PMF explored in this research should be readily replaceable. As 
an example, the connecting PMFs that we synthesized are workable defaults that we 
expect our users will research and improve on as time goes on.   
Stimuli
Biology Module/Stress
Personality,
Culture,
Emotion
Memory
Cognitive
Response
be free
help others
support terrorist
hide terrorist distract guards
crowd together block guards vision
be independent
sacrifice life
protect terrorist
survive
run for cover
protect children
T
BR =   E [  Σ P ∗ U(st, at) ]
t=1+
-
Perception Module Expression
Social Module,
Relations,
Trust
  
Figure 1.  Unified Architecture of Behavior 
(4) Agent Archetypes and Individual Differences -- When we synthesize a set of 
PMFs for each module, one should be able to calibrate and tune the parameters to 
recreate the coping patterns of archetypical classes of individuals. In this fashion, 
autonomous agents are capable of relatively realistic coping patterns. For example, in 
crowd scenes, one might like to have agent archetypes that characterize the mean 
behavior patterns of orderly protestors, provocateurs, looting hooligans, and so on. For 
each archetype, what’s interesting is not strictly the mean behavior pattern, but what 
emerges from the collective. To understand that, one expects to instantiate many 
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instances of each archetype where each agent instance is a perturbation of the parameters 
of the set of PMFs whose mean values codify the archetypical class of agent they are 
drawn from. This means that any computerization of PMFs should support stochastic 
experimentation of behavior possibilities. It also means that individual differences, even 
within instances of an archetype, will be explicitly accounted for.  
 (5) Find the Synergy – The unifying behavior architecture described here has an 
implementation that we refer to as PMFserv as Figure 2 portrays (Silverman et al., 2001; 
Silverman, Johns, O'Brien, Weaver, and Cornwell, 2002; Silverman, Johns, Weaver, 
O’Brien, & Silverman, 2002). Systems should be more than the sum of their parts. In 
developing the synthesis, our goal was that it would support a wide range of agent 
behavior studies and applications. 
Stimuli
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Simulated World
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Figure 2. The Current PMFserv Implementation of the Unified Architecture 
The next few subsections turn our attention to the modules and details of Figure 2, so it is 
worth concluding this section with a few words on Figure 1 in total. At the time we 
started this research in the late 1990s, we were unaware of any implementations 
straddling the modules of Figure 1, and to this date there still are not any available to the 
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practice. However, there is a growing interest in this field on behalf of sponsors and of 
researchers, and one can see many nascient attempts, some of which will be mentioned in 
what follows along with earlier research relevant to each module of Figures 1 and 2.  
 
2.1 Biology Module: Physiology and Stress PMFs 
Following the guidance of Principle 1, one must ask how does biology and stress 
influence coping behaviors and the other modules of our architecture. If it doesn’t 
contribute, we might be tempted to omit biology. However, even entertainment game 
characters illustrate the importance of this subsystem and provide "damage reservoirs" 
and "energy power ups" as crude surrogates. Likewise, many military simulators include 
crude injury and fatigue PMFs. But how do biology and physiology influence overall 
behavior, perception, and decision functioning? Our search of the literature in the late 
1990s and consults with domain experts revealed a PMF that directly addressed this 
question, the Janis-Mann coping styles model.  
 
Janis & Mann (1977) provide what is probably the most widely sited methodology of 
decision strategies for coping under stress, time pressure, and risk. Their methodology 
has extensive empirical backing and has been replicated and validated by other 
researchers as well: e.g., see Wohl [1981] among others. Thus it also satisfies our 3rd 
principle (best of breed PMF).   However, despite its stauture, we are unaware of any 
computer agent implementations to use as a plug-in for our architecture, and so we have 
implemented our own version. The reader can see our interpretation of this methodology 
as the steps of the inverted U-curve of Figure 3. The methodology includes a decisional 
balance sheet that indicates how stress, time pressure, and risk drive the decision maker 
from one coping strategy to another and we depict these items across the X-axis of Figure 
3. These coping strategies provide the connection between biology (i.e., stress) and the 
perception, personality, and decision modules of our overall architecture. 
 
In particular, a given stress level dictates the agent’s ability to collect and process both 
information and action alternatives (a ∈A) when in a given state, s. All but the third of 
the coping patterns (vigilance) are regarded by Janis & Mann (1977) as "defective." The 
first two, while occasionally adaptive in routine or minor decisions, often lead to poor 
decision-making if a vital choice must be made. Similarly, the last two patterns may 
occasionally be adaptive but generally reduce the DM's chances of averting serious loss. 
The authors note, vigilance, although occasionally maladaptive if danger is imminent and 
a split-second response is required, generally leads to “decisions of the best quality". 
Some authors have since refined these ideas, as with Klein et al. (1993) who show that 
experts work effectively in “near panic”, vigilant, and other modes where they 
immediately recognize a best or near best alternative without vigilant scanning of other 
alternatives.    
 
The goal of a computerized implementation of this PMF is for overall integrated stress 
(what we label iSTRESS) to emerge dynamically as events affect the agent's biology.  
Unfortunately, Janis & Mann (1977) do not provide either (1) precise threshold values 
that indicate when decision makers trigger a change in coping style (Ωi), or (2) any 
insight into how to integrate the many diverse stimuli, factors, or PMFs that determine 
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stress and time pressure or risk. For these purposes, at present we use logic rules to 
combine these and the Gillis-Hursch (see below) factors into integrated stress as the 2nd 
from the right PMF box within the Biology Module of Figure 2 indicates. For example, 
our PMF for Integrated Stress had to have rules that account for facts such as a Very 
High value of any one of the factors could push the agent to panic. However, panic is 
more likely if at least one factor is very high and another is high. Or alternatively, if one 
factor is very high and both of the others are moderately high, panic might also result. As 
per Principles 2 and 3, these heurisitics are extensions to the original Janis-Mann 
methodology necessitated by implementation. They are worthy of empirical study on 
their own, and we have segregated them in our PMFserv implementations so that other 
investigators may alter or override them as their research warrants. Indeed, a doctoral 
student is currently exploring these heuristics at present. 
 
a.  Theory              b.  Implementation 
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Figure 3.  The Classic Performance Moderator Function is an Inverted-U 
(a) Janis-Mann Coping Styles PMF from the Literature 
(b) Janis-Mann PMF as Implemented Visually in PMFserv 
 
As stated above, a major gap in the literature is that very few studies have been 
conducted to determine how multiple factors combine to produce overall or integrated 
stress in an individual (e.g., Hammond, 2000).  One approach is that of Hendy and Farrell 
(1997), who adopt an information processing theory and model that focuses on 
equipment and screen operators and includes factors such as task workload (bits to 
process) and work rate (bits/sec).  They offer an information processing (bit throughput, 
error rate, decision time) account that attempts to explain the effects of time pressure, 
task difficulty, mental capacity, fatigue, motivation, anxiety, and the like.  However, they 
offer little data to support their model.  
 
Hursh & McNally (1993) reviewed 1,300 studies to develop a model of decision making 
in battle that focuses solely on effectiveness under stress.  Gillis and Hursh (1999) later 
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extended this model to account for what they claimed were the prime determinan
(stressed) performance: effective fatigue, event stress, and time pressure.  They 
implemented this approach into a software system that we tried to get ahold of and 
integrate within PMFserv, however, the Army no longer supports that code. PMFserv 
ts of 
2).   
 of 
 
lly 
hat 
 model since we are interested 
in accuracy and first order approximations (Principle 2): 
TRESS(t) = f{ES(t), TP(t), EF(t)}             [1.0] 
ility 
ive 
perate). However, for now 
P is afforded to agents by markups on the simulated world.  
r 
. The 
 
ne can 
o 
l 
nd 
ation of the Gillis-Hursch 
MF since that leads to increases in Effective Fatigue (EF).  
thus had to have its own Gillis-Hursch implementation (see Biology Module of Figure 
In particular, following Gillis and Hirsh, we obtain: (1) event stress (ES) which tracks 
agents’ adverse and positive events, (2) time pressure (TP) which is a normalized ratio
available vs. required time for the tasks at hand, and (3) effective fatigue (EF) which
integrates a normalized metric based on current level of many of the physiological 
reservoirs. Each of these is quantitatively derived and then can be sent to be emotiona
filtered since for example a stoic will construe the same facts differently than a high 
neurotic (The next section describes the emotional filtering). The quantitative factors t
go into these modifiers are then summarized via the following where f{.} is our PMF 
mentioned above and which is currently a linear additivity
 
iS
 
The interesting thing about this breakout is that it now opens the door to inter-operab
of numerous other PMFs that are well researched in their own right. For example as 
shown in earlier Figure 2, the Event Stress (ES) is provided by our emotion module by 
counting any events that the agent's value system and personality profile causes negat
emotion to be activated (Section 2.2). Time Pressure (TP) is computed in some well-
regarded cognitive architectures (e.g., COGNET and iGen in Zachary et al. (2001) and 
we have worked with them to study best approaches to inter-o
T
 
Finally, Effective Fatigue (EF) is the place where we integrate the remainder of ou
biology/physiology module as depicted in Figure 4. Specifcially, to support rapid 
implementation, calibration, and study of a wide array of physiological PMFs, we have 
adopted a visual programming metaphor based on reservoirs with tanks and valves
biology tanks editor shown in Figure 4 includes a pulldown menu for adding new 
reservoir tanks, valves, and gates. Through a set of popup menus, one can also set all the
parameters of each of these objects, create their dependencies, and spawn GUI controls 
for them (e.g., as shown on right of Figure 4). Through another pulldown one can start 
and stop the module. By doing this and by altering the sliders on the right panel, o
test the PMFs alone and in concert, thereby tuning the model in real time. In the 
implementation actually depicted in Figure 4, there is a stomach tank that computes 
nutritional input (kcals), a sleep, injury, and temperature tank. Each of these is attached t
the wastage valve of the energy tank. That tank is depleted by these interactions as wel
as by exertion. All these (and other tanks the user may wish to add) are calibrated a
tuned to field data for the archetypes being modeled. Drops in the energy tank, as 
indicated in earlier Figure 2, are monitored by our implement
P
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One might pause and ask at this point, is it really important to support the integration and 
interoperation of so vast a potential array of PMFs? Once again, if our goal is to facili
expanding the science (and it is), then we need a flexible implementation that allows us 
rapidly integrate, test, and update (or replace/override) numerous PMFs, whatever is 
relevant to the scenario to be studied. For example, if one is interested in the impact of 
non-lethal weapons on crowds, very different PMFs should be integrated here than if one 
is interested in trauma and injury due to warfare. Likewise, if one had a better idea for 
EF, it is easy to set the Gillis-Hursch PMF to monitor some other external model instea
of our energy tank status level. Some users have used this physiology module to study 
implementation of various low-level PMFs, how to calibrate the tanks and valves, and
how all that inter-operates with the three summary stressors and with integrated stre
and the emergence of coping style: e.g., see (a) Bharathy (2002) fo
tate 
to 
d 
the 
 
ss 
r a study of sleep, 
       
igure 4.  Physiology module uses a hydraulic metaphor for visual editing (and 
es 
exercise, forced marches, and nutrition and (b) Bharathy et al (2003) for a study of 
various injury metrics and types of weaponry and trauma effects. 
F
operation) of PMFs as systems of reservoirs, gates, and  valv
 
2.2  Value Trees and Emotion Modeling: Personality and Culture 
This section brings us to the questions of: (1) what roles do values (personal, cultural) 
and emotions play in the overall behavior architecture (earlier Figure 1) and (2) how 
might we implement and integrate existing PMF models to reasonably recreate actual 
human behaviors? In the past decade, research has yielded an explosion of literature on 
the connection between emotional and cognitive processes. Most notably, as suggested in 
earlier Figure 2, we have been inspired by the connection that Damasio (1994) draws and
how emotion guides practical decision making. His "somatic marker h
 
ypothesis," though 
ot universally accepted, suggests that body states associated with emotions precipitate n
somatic markers (gut feelings) that serve to guide decision making.   
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From our architectural view, this hypothesis implies (1) continual two-way interaction of
the emotions with human biology, perceptual, and decision making modules; and (2) the 
need for an explicit representation of the motivations against which events are appraised. 
Our architecture and our emotion module are an attempt to implement these concerns, 
though since Damasio’s work is not intended for computational implementation and thu
stops short of many of the details required to do so, we view his theory primarily as an 
inspiration. For example, Figure 2 shows that our affect or emotion module is driven by 
perception and biology, and in turn, produces the Event Stress (ES) used in the biolog
which alters focus and perception. Likewise, our emotion module is implemented with a
 
s 
y 
 
t of value trees representing agent motivation and, with help from the social relations 
 
ll. 
 
de 
ystrasiewicz’s focus is 
n prescriptive algorithms and formal rigor, and he has published on the computational 
 
 
ions 
ct how differently they might assess the same events, actions, and artifacts in the 
orld around them.  This requires that the emotion module
se
module, events activate nodes on these trees to produce emotions and an overall gut 
feeling that we treat as subjective expected utility (SEU) to guide the decision module. 
 
Before we explain how all this works, others have implemented emotion models as we
For example, Bates et al (1992) and Elliott (1992) each offer a robust implementation,
some elements of which we duplicate here. However, their focus is on agents that provi
socially interesting reactions in interactive dramas and fictions. Their agents draw no 
connections between either biological or decisionmaking functions (and have limited 
perceptual abilities), and as such these systems are not directly useful to our purposes. 
Likewise, there are a few agent researchers examining the interplay of emotions and 
decisionmaking: e.g., see Gmystrasiewicz and Lisetti (2000). Gm
o
complexity his approach imposes.  Our work contrasts with such efforts since we focus 
on descriptive research and scalable human behavior modeling.  
 
Our goal for this module is to explore how well alternative PMFs found in the literature 
support the requirements of the Damasio-inspired model, although that model itself may
be amended in future implementations. In order to support research on alternative 
emotion theories, this subsystem must include an easily alterable set of activation/decay
equations and parameters for a variable number of emotions.  Further, since appraisials 
are based on models of motivation (value trees), this module must include a motivation 
representation, editor, and processor.  Simply by authoring alternative value trees, one 
should be able to capture the behavior of alternative “types” of people and organizat
and predi
w  be able to derive the gut feel 
(subjective expected utility and payoff) that the decision module will need to make 
choices. 
 
We start at the bottom and examine how our different emotions arise when confronted by
a new state, s, of the world, or in reaction to thinking about being in that state. In general
we propose that any of a number of ξ diverse emotions could arise with intensity, I, and 
that this intensity would be somehow correlated to the importance
 
, 
 of one’s values or set 
f value trees (ν) and whether those values succeed or fail for the state in question.  We 
express this as follows and make referen eters on earlier Figure 2, though not 
all of these were displayed on that chart due to space limitations: 
o
ce to param
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∑ ∑ξ =k)s(I υ jijl )]N,O(*)r1(f*)(W[ f2
ξ∈ ∈Jj Cijklc
      [2.0] 
 = The set of all agents relevant to .  J1 is the set consisting only of the self, and J2 is 
e’s ith 
r 1=failure) by world state k. Here a path refers to the vertical set of nodes 
nd branches that are activated from a given affordance (e.g., from perceiving the current 
(rjk) = A function that captures the strength of positive and negative relationships one 
e 
 
t 
s. the present vs. the future. For example, as time proceeds emotions about the future 
ns of concern in any emotional appraisal – 
alues, relationships, and temporal aspects. For the sake of simplicity, we assume linear 
 
 
cuss 
er pair 
s 
 same time and if their intensities are equal, they cancel out from a 
 
Where, 
Iξ(sk) = Intensity of emotion, ξ, due to the kth state of the world 
Jξ ξ
the set consisting of everyone but the self, and J is the union of J1 and J2. The relationship 
parameters (alignment, trust, cognitive unit, etc.) of the next section define these. 
 
Wij(ν ijkℓ) = Weighted importance of the values of agent j that succeed and fail in on
value tree (see trees and Bayesian weights discussion below for further explanation). 
 
ν ijkℓ = A list of paths through the ith value tree of agent j triggered by affordance ℓ 
(0=success o
a
state of the world, or from contemplating a new world state that a given action might 
precipitate) 
 
f1
has with the j agents and objects that are effected or spared in world state k. (Again thes
relationship parameters and their possible settings are clarified in Section 2.4). 
 
f2(O,N) = A function that captures temporal factors of the world state and how to keep
apart emotions that might get activated in the current time frame that are about the pas
v
may need to be recognized as and converted to emotions about the present (e.g., hope 
being dashed might be more intense than just disappointment in this time tick alone). 
 
This expression captures the major dimensio
v
additivity of multiple activations of the same emotion from the i=1,I different sets of 
values that the world state may precipitate.  
 
There are several emotion models from the psychology literature that can help to provide
greater degrees of detail for such a model, particularly a class of models known as 
cognitive appraisal theories.  Specifically, we have examined OCC: Ortony, Clore, and 
Collins (1988), Roseman et al (1990), and Lazarus (1991). Each of these take as input a 
set of things that the agent is concerned about and how they were effected recently, and
determine which emotions result. Most of them fit into the structure of equation 2.0 but 
they have different strengths to bring to bear, and we have abstracted them and dis
this in Silverman, B.G., Johns, M., Shin, H., Weaver, R. (2002). At present and as did 
Bates (1992) and Elliott (1992), we have decided to pursue the OCC model (Ortony et al., 
1988) to see how it helps out. In the OCC model, there are 11 pairs of oppositely 
valenced emotions (ξ). One pair we use here as an example is pride-shame. Anoth
we mentioned earlier was hope-fear for future events.  One can experience both emotion
of a given pair at the
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utility perspective though we send negative emotions to the biology module (ES 
 
e 
 
 threshold settings. We refer to these three trees as the GSP 
ees. The branches of these trees are Bayesian weighted to capture relative importance 
 enough to require a major change to 
OCC. Our emotion mo detail in numerous other papers (available 
at http discussion here will be brief.  The general 
idea is that an agent posse
gure 5.  Illustrative shred of GSP trees and values of a sample terrorist 
counting) and an expression module might not treat them as canceling, particularly for 
agent embodiment. 
 
We have built a number of agents with value trees and find that it is best to represent an
agent’s values in three distinct trees illustrated in the leftmost box of the Emotion Modul
of Figure 2. An agent’s long term desired states for the world are placed as nodes on a 
Preference Tree, the Standards Tree captures the actions they believe should or should 
not be followed in trying to reach those preferred states (e.g., religious commandments, 
military doctrine, civil codes, etc.), and any short term needs are placed as nodes on a 
Goal Tree. In regards to the latter tree, we often place physiologic and stressor concerns 
on this tree which causes the agent to have emotions about its biological functions if the
reservoirs in Section 2.1 pass
tr
and to help represent behavioral patterns in prior observations of the human archetypes 
that these agents represent.  
 
The OCC model (middle Emotion Module box in Figure 2) assumes a social agent has 
three types of value sets that are almost isomorphic to our GSP trees, although they 
provide little guidance on how they believe these should be implemented: goals for 
action, standards that people should follow, and preferences for objects. This latter set 
differs from our own definition, though not seriously
del is described in great 
://www.seas.upenn.edu/~barryg) so our 
sses the three GSP Trees.  
Fi
 14
 
 
 
  
 
An action can be represented by a series of successes and failures on the sub-nodes of
these three trees.  Each sub-goal is given a weight that describes how much it contribu
to its parent node. When contemplating a next action to take, the agent calculates the 
emotions it expects to derive from every action available to it, as constrained by 
perception and coping style.  We assume that utilities for next actions, ak, are derived 
from the emotional activations. Silverman, Johns, Weaver et al. (2002) describe the se
mathematical equations for the use of the OCC model to help generate up to 11 pairs 
emotions with intensities (Iξ) for a given action.  These expressions capture the major 
dimensions of concern in any emotional model – values, relationships, and temporal 
aspects. Utility may be thought of as the overall ‘feeling’ and as such, are simple 
summation of all positive and negative emotions for an action leading to a state. Since 
ere will be 11 pairs of oppositely valenced emotions in the OCC model, our Dam
 
tes 
t of 
of 
asio 
ox 
ub
motional appraisal of 
e-weighted 
th
b on the right of the Emotion Module in Figure 2 normalizes the sum as follows so that 
ct ected utility varies between –1 and +1: s je ive exp
 
SEU = Σ Iξ(ak)/11        [3.0] 
         ξ 
 
While one can argue against the idea of aggregating individual emotions, this summation 
is consistent with the somatic marker theory. One learns a single impression or feeling 
about each state and about actions that might bring about or avoid those states. The utility 
rm, in turn, is derived dynamically during each iteration from an ete
the utility of each afforded action strategy relative to that agent’s importanc
values (GSP trees) minus the cost of carrying out that strategy. 
 
2.3) Perception and Ecological Psychology: The Affordance Approach 
For all the PMFs described thus far to work, the agent must use its perception module
constrained by coping mode and emotive needs, to see what’s going on in the world.
Perception should be focused based on an agent’s physiology, coping style, prior 
emotional needs, and any memory elements that might have been created before the 
current cycle.  For example, if the agent’s coping mode is Panic or Unconflicted 
Adherence, it will not notice anything new in the world.  Otherwise, PMFserv applies 
affordance theory (Gibson, 1979, Toth, 1995) such that each object in the simulated 
world executes perception rules to determine how it should be perceived by the agent and 
generates a list of the corresponding actions (ak) and affordances it can offer that agent 
(e.g., a rock indicates it can be thrown, which will afford success in hurting an opponen
and will consume x units of energy).  When these actions are selected as shown in Figure 
, the affordances provide reservoir replenishment or drawdown i
, as 
  
t 
mpacts and GSP tree 
scenario 
2
multipliers for degree of leaf node success or failure.  In this fashion, PMFserv agents 
implement situated ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979).  
 
In earlier revisions of our architecture, each agent stored its own knowledge about the 
world internally.  We ran into problems, however, when we tried to write rapid-
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generation tools.  We wanted to be able to draw agents and object from a large library of
presets that we could drag into a scene and create scenarios with no additional 
programming.  To do so, all of the perceptual data and state information for each object
in the scene would need to be generated along with a means for evaluating each option 
that tied into the individual agents’ unique standards, goals, and preferences 
 
 
trees.  We 
ould not find an elegant solution that would generate this data on the fly.  Entering it all 
 
 
e 
essor, value tree or social tanks. Each object 
ontains perception rules that determine which perceptual type is active for the agent 
ibson 
ances, 
tion of 
 
SP leaf node 
ctivations) independently of any cognition on the part of the agent. This is the arrow 
mali agent 
r” 
s. 
d might be perceived as a normal civilian until he does something to 
c
by hand was not a possibility either, given our goal of rapid composability. 
 
To allow for rapid scenario generation and modification we have removed knowledge 
about the environment from the agents themselves.  Instead of imbuing the agents with 
this knowledge, a scenario designer can build an ontology of objects in the environment
that describes how each of those objects can be perceived and used.  The popular video 
game The Sims takes a similar approach.  Our agents themselves know nothing a priori
about the environment or the actions that they can take within that environment.  Instead, 
each object in the environment contains multiple representations (perceptual types) of 
itself that include its affordances - the actions that can be taken on it, the results of those 
actions to the object being viewed, and the impact that those actions will provide to th
agent in terms of its various biology, str
c
currently perceiving the target object.   
 
The affordance approach was taken to satisfy engineering constraints rather than 
theoretical concerns, but there is no shortage of theoretical justification for making such a 
move.  In his landmark text The Perception of the Visual World (Gibson, 1950), G
argued that people perceive the objects in their environment in terms of their afford
or the opportunities for action that they provide.  For example, when we look at a 
doorknob, the actions that it offers to us – opening a door, for example, or perhaps 
hanging up a coat – are explicit in our perception.  In Gibson’s theory, the percep
an object arises from the interaction of the perceptual qualities of that object and the
perceiver’s past experiences.  There is no top-down processing at work.   In our 
implementation of this theory, the perceived object interacts with the perceiver and 
generates a list of actions along with their anticipated emotional effects (G
a
emanating from the right hand side of the Perception Module of Figure 2. 
 
For example, in the Mogadishu scenario we are currently exploring we have an object 
that represents an American helicopter (see Figure 6, below).  The helicopter has multiple 
perceptual types, each of which has a different set of actions it affords.  One So
might perceive the helicopter as a “Frightening Helicopter” that can be investigated, 
attacked, or fled from.  An agent in the militia might perceive it as an “Enemy 
Helicopter” that can be attacked, fled from, observed, or taken cover from.  A third agent 
already in combat with the helicopter might view it as a “Combatant Enemy Helicopte
that can be attacked, or taken cover from as well, but with different emotional outcome
Agents themselves are wrapped in a perception model so that, for example, a suicide 
bomber in a crow
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reveal himself, at which point those around him may shift their perception to see him as a 
suicide bomber. 
 
To accomplish perceptual shifts of this sort, each object contains a set of perception rules 
that determine which perceptual type is active for any given agent.  These rules take 
account the coping style of the perceiving agent, the way the object has been perceived in 
earlier simulator time ti
into 
cks, tests of facts about the world (“has agent x pulled out a gun?” 
tc.), whether or not the object is in the agent’s line of sight, and any other exposed 
 
convey 
lements needed to compute the emotional utility that the agent expects to receive from 
each action.  The right-h es of the GSP tree 
affordances offered by a helicop lian civilian: 
 
igure 6.  Simplified Affordance Structure of A Helicopter Object in the Simulated 
y an object in our system is 
r longer, and also includes descriptions of physiological effects, social relation impacts, 
re 
e
variable within our system that a scenario developer might want to use to determine how
an object is perceived. 
 
The affordances themselves are described in terms of their effects on a generic agent’s 
biological, stress, and social relationship parameters (tanks) as well as upon its value 
trees (leaf nodes of the goal, standard, and preference trees). Effectively, they 
e
and column of Figure 6 shows a few exampl
ter crash site, as seen by a Soma
Perceptual Type Action OCC Results T A
Interesting Object Approach G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
G.StayAlive F 0.1
UnguardedCrashSite Approach G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
Loot G.AmassW ealth S 1
G.ProtectFamily S 1
S.DoNotSteal F 0.5
S.RespectOthersProperty F 0.5
Observe G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
G.AmassW ealth S 0.2
GuardedCrashSite Approach G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
G.StayAlive F 0.4
P.ForeignSoliders S 1
Loot G.AmassW ealth S 1
G.ProtectFamily S 1
G.StayAlive F 0.8
S.DoNotSteal F 0.5
S.RespectOthersProperty F 0.5
P.ForeignSoliders S 1
Observe G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
G.AmassW ealth S 0.2
LethalCrashSite Approach G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
G.StayAlive F 1
P.ForeignSoliders S 1
Loot G.AmassW ealth S 1
G.ProtectFamily S 1
G.StayAlive F 1
S.DoNotSteal F 0.5
S.RespectOthersProperty F 0.5
G.AmassW ealth S 0.2
G.StayAlive F 0.4
Helicopter
P.ForeignSoliders S 1
Observe G.SatisfyCuriosity S 1
 
F
World 
 
 
A full listing of the perceptual types and affordances offered b
fa
and perception rules governing which perceptual type is active for any given agent. Mo
details exist in Cornwell et al., 2003; Silverman, et al., 2003. 
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Each object in the environment is marked up with as inclusive a set of perceptions and 
actions as is appropriate for the scenario.  Once these objects are marked up, any agent 
can be dropped into the scenario and automatically have an appropriate understanding of 
ow it can manipulate the objects and agents around it.  Likewise, a new object or new 
 the 
 the agent’s decision cycle, each object in the environment evaluates its perception 
les against the agent to determine the set of available perceived objects that the agent 
ther in the Cognitive Module. 
h
agent can be developed independently and instantly “understand” how to interact with
other agents and objects already deployed in the simulation.   
 
In
ru
can perceive and manipulate. We return to discuss this fur
 
 
2.4) Social Module: Relations, Trust, Theory of Mind 
 
The social module is just as vital as each of the others in our unifying architecture. For 
example, in order for human values and emotions to work, there also must be a way to 
track social relationships and who is aligned with and/or against whom. When something 
good happens to a family or ingroup member (defined here as close allies), we tend to 
have positive emotions (though possibly some envy too), and the opposite if it happens to 
our adversary. If the valence is intense enough, this will noticeably impact our Event 
Stress (ES) and begin to affect us biologically to the better or worse, respectively. 
Likewise, decisionmaking and course of action selection is affected by social alignment 
and trust. Certain classes of actions are rarely contemplated against ingroup members, 
hile others are rarely extended to rivals.  Keeping track of roles, alignment, identity, w
trust, and related social parameters thus helps to sharpen and tighten the focus of our 
perception and decision processing.  
 
In the social agent simulation community, there are a large number of approaches that we 
make some use of in this module, however, we are aware of no approaches which satisfy 
the needs of a social module that operates within a unifying architecture of behavior 
(Figure 1). For example, artificial life simulations including cellular automata and virtual 
swarms, among others, provide examples of identity and behavior shifting due to peer 
pressure and social neighbor influence, however, these omit cognitive or perceptual 
processing, and rarely include biologies: e.g., see Lustick (2002). Social network analysis 
methods, in turn, elevate the roles and relations side of this significantly, drawing 
attention to how members in cliques operate as facilitators, gatekeepers, and so on, 
however, the agents in these networks have no emotions or cognitive abilities such as 
lookahead or planning: e.g., Buchanon [2002]. Game theoretic approaches such as 
iterated prisoner dilemma implement multi-ply lookahead about next moves of other 
agents based on social alignment and trust, but only at the simplest of levels and with no 
processing about the motivations driving other agents. Hence they can only shift strategic 
approach through rebirth in mutational forms: e.g., Cederman [1997]. Even the emotion 
model implementations that had some value in the prior module offer only limited 
capability of value here since they tend to focus on a very few parameters that impact 
emotions about relationships. Still, each of these ideas is a potentially valuable 
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contribution, and those attempting social modules must either find a way to interoperate 
some of these softwares, or a way to integrate their contributions so as to study them and 
rive to a new and useful synthesis. We have chosen the latter approach for now, though d
it does not preclude subsequent interoperation for scaleup with agents at varying levels of 
granularity. 
 
Most emotion model implementations suggest social parameters such as the following 
from OCC and that we implement in PMFserv’s Social Module for each agent (see 
‘relationship tanks’ box of Figure 2): 
• Agency vs. Object – the degree to which the other agent is thought of as 
human vs. inaminate object. This shifts how we apply our standards (and how 
PMFserv applies the standards tree of a given agent). It is far easier to apply hurtful 
actions if we first objectify our opponent. 
• Cognitive Unit – This pertains to a phenomenon in which group identity shifts 
with context. The canonical example of this involves two sports fans who meet by 
chance in a rival city.  By virtue of being surrounded by others who are different from 
them, these two identify with one another in a way that would not occur in their home 
city. In cellular automata artificial society implementations, agents tend to shift 
identity when surrounded by neighbors of all one identity. In the emotion models of 
than shift 
identity. 
the prior section, the agents tend to reason about and reflect their emotion in such 
settings. Cognitive unit theory suggests they may become entrenched rather 
• Valence – This refers to the strength of a given alignment relationship. How 
strong is the bond with that friend, or how negative is the link to that rival?  
 
These kinds of variables are necessary but insufficient. Since relations are rarely static, 
agents need an apparatus to reason about other agents, and how to dynamically reclassify 
them as events occur and their behavior is revealed. The missing capability is often 
referred to as “theory of mind”, the mechanism that allows agents to interpret the internal 
e 
e en g effort to rst, elineat s 
Clo
mental states of other agents, rightly or wrongly. A full implementation of a theory of 
mind mechanism can quickly lead to computational intractability.  Our approach to date 
has been to implement two levels of capability:  
(1) A scalable capability based largely on observation of other agents’ behavior and 
simple rules for interpreting and relabeling social roles, alignment shifts, credibility 
changes, trust, etc. The approach is quite simple in concept, though takes som
knowledg gineerin  implement. Fi  one must d e discrete level
of the social scales pertinent to the scenario (e.g., alignment, group membership, 
trust, etc.). An example scale for role and alignment that we often use is as follows: 
sest Ally Friend Neutral Opponent Worst Enemy 
Next, the knowledge engineer must delineate the rules for activating a given level or 
viewpoint as well as the action categories and GSP tree affordances that then prevail 
when those perceptual types are activated. This is done in exactly the manner of the 
helicopter markup of the prior section, except now the markup is for the perceptual 
typing of other humans rather than of inanimate objects. To date we have been able 
 scale PMFserv with this approach to drive as many as 1,000 agents in crowd to
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simulations running on a single PC. Part II of this article presents more of the details 
and some examples.  
 
(2) A less scalable approach where fewer agents are attempted, but each of these are 
‘leader agents’ that seek to dynamically model the motivations and intent of the other 
leader agents as illustrated in the right hand box of Figure 2. Specifically, we are 
interested in Agent A constructing a model of Agent B’s GSP trees and then of using 
that model in the game theoretic sense to decipher B’s actions and speech acts (not 
natural language) by thinking about underlying motivations. With such a capability, 
Agent A is able to think more deliberatively about when to alter its view of another 
agent. For example, a component of the trust mechanism must address how to update 
due to degree of success of a given agent, B, on an action just completed. Was 
success just a token amount, or was it resounding? And what about a failure beyond 
agent B's control or capability? Falcone & Castelfranchi (2004) point out that for 
some uses, trust might be more properly managed via a cognitive attribution process 
which can assess the causes of a collaborator's success or failure. Likewise, they also 
raise the question of how placing trust in B might in fact alter B's trustworthiness to 
the better or worse. These suggestions are compatible with Simari & Parson's 
(2004)’s suggestion that approaches are needed which describe how humans make 
decisions, and their startling finding that these descriptions will reduce computational 
complexity of intentionality modeling (as opposed to presecriptive formalisms) as 
one attempts larger scale games. Clearly, this type of dynamic trust process modeling 
is a vital capability for agents operating in worlds where deception, bluffing, and 
manipulation are prevalent, as in the case of political leader contexts. We also project 
the need for leader agents to have to dynamically maintain and reason about other 
observational data such as, to mention a few areas, on all their relationships, on their 
r (ranging from “in-group 
ember” to “enemy”) depending on the action of the leader. Further details of this 
Johns, & Bharathy (2004), Johns (2004), Silverman 
personal credibility in the eyes of other agents, and on “tells” that might give away 
when they are bluffing or being deceitful.  
 
In the PMFserv context, since early 2004 we have been researching and developing ways 
to give PMFserv agents capabilities to descriptively model the intentions and reputations 
of other agents, and to manage discourse and speech acts intended to manipulate and 
sway other agents to their goals. This capability is part of an effort to adapt PMFserv for 
political leader modeling and so these leader agents can participate in diplomacy games 
to influence world situations and leaders while simultaneously seeking to “campaign for 
follower groups” to retain/gain power and authority.  In this gameworld, potential 
followers can move from varying levels of support for the leade
m
activity may be found in: Silverman, 
and Bharathy (2005), and Silverman, Rees, Toth, et al. (2005).  
 
2.5) The Decision Making Module 
The decision making module of Figure 2 serves as the point where diverse emotions, 
stressors, coping style, memories, and object affordances are all integrated into a decision
for action (or inaction) to transition to a new state (or remain in the same state).  In 
essence, at each tick of the simulator’s clock, each agent must be able to process the 
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following information: current state name (or ID); stress-based coping mode (Ωi where i 
= 1,5); currently afforded transitions and what action might cause those state transitions 
(anm in A(Ω)); and subjective desires for each state based on 11 pairs of emotional scal
summed into an overall utility score, SEU.  Using all of this information, the agent must 
es 
lect a decision style (Φ, defined below) and process the information to produce a best 
eration of the world.  The decision module is thus governed by the following equation: 
Rt) = A(Ω)        [4.0] 
TRES ative values of Ω 
n ) em + Δmτ pmτ  
mn = (1- EU
oe
m  =  1.0 action m is situationally relevant  
ode one might invoke SOAR, 
CT-R, COGNET, or others.  Alternatively, simulated experts can adopt the Recognition 
ann, 
ly 
v, 
e behavior is guaranteed since various reservoirs in the biology, value 
ee nodes, or relationship parameters are satiated, those that aren’t yet filled will become 
se
response (BR) that maximizes expected, discounted rewards or utilities in the current 
it
 
BEST REPLY (B   ΦiSTRESS, Ω{umn (st , amnt ), pmn},  subject to amnt  ∈  
 
Where, 
ΦiS S, Ω{.} = as defined below for the altern
pm = perceived probability = (1 – Δ
u  x (S  from equation 1.0) δ)
emΔ = m ory c fficient (discounting the past) 
τ = number periods to look back 
   0 action m not situationally relevant 
e
δ = expectation coefficient (discounting the future) 
A(Ω)  = action set available after coping mode-constrained perception 
 
This is nothing more than a stress-constrained subjective-expected utility formulation.  
Also, there is a large literature on decision style functions (e.g., among many others see 
Bradshaw et al., 1999; and Terzopoulos, 1999), and the decision processing style 
function, ΦΩ, merely indicates that there is a rich set of possibilities that one can explore 
within the framework proposed here.  Thus, in Vigilant m
A
Primed Decision Making (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, and Zsambok, 1993) style, while 
novices will tend to use a more traditional decision tree.  
 
The algorithm proposed above applies Conflict Theory where appropriate (Janis & M
1977).  That is, if the agent’s coping mode is Panic or Unconflicted Adherence, no 
alternatives are weighed and the agent will execute its panic behavior or continue to do 
what it had already decided to do in the last cycle.  Likewise, Unconflicted Change 
prevents any planning, and the agent must follow the next step of any existing plan.  On
when stress increases and the agent’s coping mode shifts to Vigilance can the agent re-
plan (with any ΦΩ method as desired). In that case, however, multi-step lookahead 
planning, cognitive processing with learning, and game theoretic processing can all be 
fully deployed. At present, we do not implement a cognitive learning model in PMFser
however, adaptiv
tr
relatively more important to the agent’s behavior, until they are staited and the others 
begin to decay. 
 
Also, as shown in Figure 2, we separate the implementation of Φ and BR into the two 
PMF boxes shown in the Cognitive Module of Figure 2. For reactive agents such as 
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crowd members, the Intention Management module reduces to one-ply lookahead and 
generally there are few action choices that need to be processed. The affordance approac
suggests the actions available to crowd members and the decision PMF (left side) pas
candidate actions one at a time to the Emotion Module to generate its emotions and SEU 
if the action succeeded and the new world future actually occurred. However, for mo
deliberative agents, such as leaders, the Best Reply (BR) is not so easily found. The 
Intention Management PMF must consider multi-step lookahead, other agent motivation
(from Nested Intentionality Processing passed through the E
h 
ses 
re 
s 
motion), a sequence of 
ossible actions, and how to manage its own reputation and relationship parameters. This 
 
entioned already in the discussion of our leader research. 
o Date
p
becomes a large search space and we are currently researching new approaches for it as
m
 
3) Lessons Learned from the Unified Architecture and PMFserv Studies T  
 largely based on synthesizing PMFs found in the literature.  Since our goal 
as to enable the science to be implemented and reused, these next few comments may 
ience 
 
This research started out with a unified behavior architecture and several guiding 
principles about how the systems approach might lead to instantiating such an 
architecture
w
be thought of as results from the perspective of how to facilitate better behavioral sc
in models. 
 
1- Exploring Science via the Unified Architecture: Pros – The first versions of 
PMFserv included 3 behavioral modules (physiology/stress, emotion, and cognition)
with the software cobbled together between modules as a sequence. Through usag
PMFserv across diverse scenarios we became keenly aware of the difficulties our 
implementation posed both as a strict sequence and in terms of replacing PMFs we 
found to be inadequate or which we no longer wanted in a scenario. This lead to 
evolution of the unifying architecture as shown in Figure 1, and to our view of it a
system of many interacting and highly inter-operating parts. A major challenge of
research, is the validity of the behavioral models we derive from the literature and tr
to integrate within our architecture. As engineers, we are concerned with validity 
from several perspectives including the (1) data-groundedness of the models and 
parameter settings we extract from the literature, (2) accuracy of our coded versi
relative to the theory it purports to implement, and (3) how the unified result work
terms of correspondence of agent behavior with actual tendencies observed in the real
world.  In terms of data-groundedness, we conducted an extended review of the
behavioral literature and found a great many studies that seem to be legitimately 
grounded and that possess model parameter significance from a statistical sense
have tried to provide one such collection of PMFs in this paper. This is not the 
penultimate implementation rather it is at present a humble structure scientific
We have striven initially for satisfying a workability test. That is, we set out to 
attempt to learn what we could gain by having viable models integrated across all 
subsystems and within each subsystem. In that regard, our efforts to date are 
successful. Where feasible, we have tried to encapsulate different models and we no
have an integrated fabric stitching together the models of varying groundedness and 
of different opinion leaders. Via the unifying architecture, we can rather easily plug in
 
e of 
s a 
 this 
y 
on 
s in 
 
 
. We 
ally. 
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a new opinion leader’s model into a given module and run it to study its impa
properties, and its strengths and weaknesses.  Thus earlier versions omitted the value
tree reservoirs and perception layers, but now they can be added or not. In modeling 
political leaders we need less of the physiology or stress modeling and more 
personality profiling and standards tree elements. If one wanted purely rationalistic
ct, its 
 
 
reasoning, one could turn off stress and emotion processing entirely and “calculated 
ng utilities” and PMFserv’s decision unit would still operate. In that sense the unifyi
architecture is also an “algorithm” of the behaviors that one believes are relevant. 
 
2- Exploring Science via the Unified Architecture: Cons – The largest scientific 
negative to our efforts thus far is that we reveal the many places where first princi
are simply missing in the field at large. Most of the models we implement in PMF
have no prior implementations and thus are underspecified, requiring us to fill in
missing items as best as currently possible. This is true of Janis-Mann’s decisio
conflict theory, of Damasio’s Hypothesis, of the GSP value trees, of the decision 
theoretic processor that uses descriptive models of coping behavior, and so on. 
Further, the interrelations between the many parts have more frequently been 
neglected than attended to in the field. Our implementation thus highlights many of 
the issues that could form an agenda for principles of synthetic research in behavior 
modeling. This is not to say that reasonably realistic models of human behavior ar
unattainable at present. For example, over the past three years, various predecessors 
to the version of PMFserv framework just described have been used to construct and 
simulate the people and objects of a number of scenarios, that depicted emergent 
crowd scenes.  Each featured a crowd gathering to protest a social injustice.  In one 
series of scenarios this injustice was a roadblock that kept people from going to work.  
In several others, protests outside of a prison by various agents (mediated by stress, 
emotion, and social identity PMFs) lead to rioting and looting of nearby stores an
the intimidation of police and protestor’s alike.  In the various crowd scenarios t
we evaluated the impact of diverse PMFs (e.g., alternative personal and cultural va
levels, impact of chanting and taunting, and diverse security doctrine/orders and 
behavior) on crowd behavior and on when new crowd equilibria emerged (e.g., 
peaceful protest, scatter, riot).  These efforts enabled us to document a number of 
lessons learned about the replication of anticipated emergence of different types of 
crowd behavior (Silverman, Johns, O'Brien, Weaver, and Cornwell, 2002; Silverm
Johns, Weaver, O'Brien, and Silverman, 2002; Cornwell, Silverman, O'Brien, and 
Johns, 2002; Johns & Silverman, 2001).  As an example of correspondence checking, 
the crowd literature (Horowitz, 2001; McPhail & Wohlstein, 1983) indicates th
looting tends to occur when young unemployed males (who rarely join organized 
activities) take advantage of chaos and distracted security forces.  In our simulations, 
female protesters and employed men tended to flee from riot situations, while 
unemployed men lurked on the fringes of the protest scene and then proceeded to riot 
and loot if violence and chaos occurred. Violence and chaos generally occurred when
we added provocateur agents to the protest scene, decreased the amount of sec
agents prese
p
ples 
serv 
 the 
n 
e 
d 
ested, 
lue 
an, 
at 
 
urity 
nt, and altered the security agent’s standards tree to permit them to strike 
rovocateurs who are overly persistent.  This type of result indicates at least surface 
correspondence and helps to increase confidence in the workings of the PMF 
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collection. 
 
3- Introducing Visual Programming in the Physiology Module and Beyond – The 
earliest versions of the physiology module had hard-coded PMFs for eight reservoirs
Updating these, adding new ones, or altering the collection required someone to learn
the code, a prohibitive activity. Through the usages mentioned above we had to
new PMFs for the effect of chanting, weaponry, adrenaline, and so on. Eventually
dawned on us that the proper way to do this was to provide this module with a 
visually programmed user interface, following the model-view-controller design 
pattern. This has proved to be a valuable time saver for creating new scenarios that 
have need of new or different PMFs. Due to the success in permitting users to input 
models without programming barriers, we have since applied this same model-view
controller design pattern to each of the other modules (e.g., integrated stressor tanks, 
GSP tree editing as in Figure 5, affordance editing, social relation parameter tanks, 
and so on) though few of the GUIs are shown in this paper. As Part II will explain, we 
have also found it useful for tra
. 
 
 add 
 it 
-
ining developers to be able to use these same ideas in 
the reuse of digital casts as well as in runtime pausing and editing of characters’ PMF 
settings as scenarios play out.  
 
4- Advancing Affordability Through Affordances – In all our early versions of 
PMFserv, we were caught in the tension between viewing our agents as finite state 
machines vs. infinite state machines. In the former approach, since there are only a 
finite number of actions for a bot to choose from, it was convenient to think of the 
agents as iterating around Markov chains. A node on the chain would describe the 
state that an agent was in, regardless of the myriad of physiologic, stress, and
tree activations that might exist for alternative agents arriving at that state. T
of thinking rapidly began to break down as our scenarios grew in scope and 
complexity. We were soon creating hundreds of Markov chains in complex 
hierarchies to capture the many activity sets a given agent might migrate through. 
Even small changes to scenarios often meant major revisions to dozens of Markov 
chains, a time consuming task: e.g., see Weaver, Silverman, et al. (2001). Observing 
that there was little need for finite state machine constraints in our simulated worl
we abandoned the Markovian approach and implemented the situated cognition form 
of perception. We believe from our own experiences that this radically improves 
maintainability -- much easier to add new objects to the world, and the Markov 
gets generated dynamically at runtime as scenario details unfold. It’s a technique use
in some popular videogames (e.g., The Sims) where it has proven to be highly 
programmable by the non-programmer public (power users). In an earlier paper
presented an informal proof of this thesis where we compared the efforts of our own 
scenario programmers under the old and new approaches: [Cornwell, O’Bri
Silverman, & Toth, 2003]. We have yet to conduct a formal proof but we bel
an analysis would demonstrate a non-monotonic relationship between new 
objects/events in the world and representations in the mind. In the standard, 
traditional symbolic approaches, the relationship is monotonic increasing, if not 
exponential, not only with respect to knowledge management
/or GSP 
his way 
ds, 
chain 
d 
 we 
en, 
ieve such 
 but also with respect to 
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software maintenance. In any event, we have newly switched to this approach a
will present some of its capabilities in Part II of this paper. 
 
5-
nd 
 Finding the Synergies -- In bringing together the parts shown in Figure 2 and 
implemented in PMFserv, we have discovered that we have created a powerful, 
m the literature could be implemented in a month’s time 
thods from the literature along with results from the field and 
) and Silverman et al (2004) used open sources and content 
roject, Dobeck, Gadiraju, & Mason (2004) used 
shelf political leader Personality Profiling 
e described in Silverman, 
Rees, Toth, et al. (2005). This is an example of how agents can use PMFserv to model 
putation 
 
ation builders were able to visually tune the existing software 
nd edit parameters to achieve their study objectives. In the last of these cases, the 
as PMFs that future users can visually program and 
readily adaptable capability that extends beyond its parts. The engineering advances 
of lessons 3 and 4 opened up the door for users to achieve this potential. As a few 
examples:  
• Cornwell, et al. (2002) studied the impact of chanting on crowd members and 
found that music PMFs fro
via a combination of existing capabilities of the Perception, Emotion, and Social 
modules. He summarizes studies of how domestic crowd behavior shifts with and 
without chanting activity; 
• In two separate studies, Bharathy et al. (2002, 2003) worked with our university’s 
sleep center and a trauma surgeon, respectively, and was able to take fatigue models 
and trauma scoring me
to implement these models within PMFserv and tune them adequately for agents in 
our various crowd emulations. He subsequently added the impact of stimulants such 
as adreline and Khatt. 
• Lombard et al. (2003
analysis to instantiate the value systems of cultural archetypes that recreate the 
Bakarra market denizens of Black Hawk Down. That case study is reported in detail 
in Part II of this article. 
• In an 8 week graduate class p
PMFserv to create a number of household pets and to simulate their personalities, 
needs, and behaviors in reacting to toys, furniture, food, each other, and human 
inhabitants in their owner’s house. 
• In about 2 person months of effort, Bharathy (2005), and Silverman and Bharathy 
(2005) successfully implemented an off-the-
Tool within the existing value system of the Emotion Module and applied it to 
construct models of and recreate behaviors of various leaders from the 3rd Crusade 
(e.g., Richard, Saladin, Emir of Acre, etc.). 
• Johns (2004) and Silverman, Johns, & Bharathy (2004) explain how the existing 
PMFserv collection is being used and extended to support the modeling of world 
leaders able to play an existing strategic dipolomacy gam
the value systems of other agents (nested intentionality), manage their own re
and credibility, and  strategize in game theoretic settings.   
In all but the last PMFserv usage case study, there was no new programming 
required. These applic
a
new capability is being added 
benefit from as well. 
 
4.  Conclusions and Next Steps 
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This article has reviewed the results of six years of research on ways to enhance th
realism of synthetic agents. We have pursued this agenda with attention to data-
groundedness of the models and PMFs we incorporated and with the hope of providing
framework to foster the easy inclusion, replacement, and study of a wide array of 
physiologic, stress, emotion, cultural, social, and decision models -- enabling better 
science to be inserted into models of syn
e 
 a 
thetic agent behavior. This article concluded 
ith lessons on how we have tried to improve the engineering of this framework as we 
t 
 
serv 
 quite 
bout this invitation, and present the results in Part II of this article along with 
e results of a serious validation test of our framework – that of rapidly composing 
er culture that are faithful to the behaviors observed in that 
 
, we’d like to thank 
Eileen Bjorkman, Dexter Fletcher, Capt. Mike Lillienthal, Sue Numerich, Joe Toth, John 
Tyler, Ruth Willis, and Michael Young for many useful discussions about how to apply 
PMFserv. Any claims are the responsibility of the authors alone.  
w
responded to new scenario demands that required the rapid updating and swapping of 
PMFs and their related parameter sets. 
 
One final result of all this framework improvement effort, and of our domestic crowd 
scene results as mentioned above, is that we were asked to apply PMFserv in an attemp
to recreate portions of the crowd and militia behaviors observed in the Ranger operation
in Mogadishu as popularized in the book and movie: Black Hawk Down. This raised the 
prospect of modeling different cultural standards and personal value sets. Further, the 
invitation was to use our PMFserv to drive the characters in a videogame engine called 
Unreal Tournament. This meant we would also be examining how to embed the PMF
in other vendors’ systems and along with other forms of agent modeling. We were
enthused a
th
characters from anoth
scenario. 
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